Kratzer (1989) proposed a semantics for counterfactuals based on situations, claiming it to be an improvement over Lewis-style ordering semantics (which, as Lewis (1981) proved, is equivalent to Kratzer's (1981) premise semantics). Kratzer's (1989) situation semantics for counterfactuals is a refinement of a naive version of premise semantics (not the premise semantics actually advocated by Kratzer 1981) and makes crucial use of the relation called `lumping' between propositions, understood as sets of possible situations.
A careful examination of Kratzer's (1989) definitions shows that her situation semantics for counterfactual conditionals make the construction truth-functional. Specifically, `would'-conditionals come out equivalent to material conditionals, and `might'-conditionals, simple conjunctions.
We discuss where the analysis goes wrong, and how one might try to rectify it.
This is joint work with Stanley Peters and Stefan Kaufmann.