

A SINGLE-TYPE SEMANTICS FOR THE PTQ-FRAGMENT

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ABSTRACT. In [2], Montague defines a formal semantics for natural language which interprets a small fragment of English through the use of *two* basic types of objects: individuals and propositions. In this talk, I present a comparable theory, which only uses *one* basic type of object (hence, *single-type semantics*). The possibility of the latter has been conjectured by Partee [3] to account for recent findings in language development [1]. The resulting theory captures the propositional interpretation of proper names and (in-)definite NPs, unifies Montague's linguistic ontology, and yields insight into the apparatus of types in formal semantics.

Keywords Single-type hypothesis, Linguistic ontology, Flexible Montague grammar, Type theory, Unification.

REFERENCES

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