

Motion deixis, reported discourse, and presupposition projection

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This paper develops a model theoretic analysis of presuppositions induced by deictic predicates (e.g. *go*, *come*, *bring*). The pragmatic meanings associated with such predicates (see Fillmore 1997, Kuno 1987, among others) satisfy the standard criteria of presuppositions. For example, the pragmatic meaning of ‘come’, which can be roughly formulated as: “the speaker (or the addressee) is at the goal point at the event time or utterance time”, (i) is not cancellable, (ii) survives under negation, (iii) is not inherited to the whole sentence when it is triggered by the consequent of a conditional and is entailed by the antecedent:

- (1) a. John came to Tokyo. (**ps**: the speaker is/was in Tokyo)
- b. John did not come to Tokyo. (**ps**: the speaker is/was in Tokyo)
- c. If I had been in Tokyo, John would have come there, too. (~~**ps**: the speaker is/was in Tokyo~~)

Presuppositions triggered by deictic predicates, however, differ from those triggered by ‘manage to V’, ‘stop V-ing’, etc. in one respect: they are not (always) blocked by attitude predicates like ‘believe’, which are alleged “filters” (e.g., ‘Mary believes that John managed to escape’ does not presuppose ‘John tried to escape’, although arguably it presupposes ‘Mary believes that John tried to escape’; Heim 1992).

Deictic predicates occurring in an attitude report can be “anchored” either to the external speaker or the reported agent (Kuno 1988); (2), for example, has two possible presuppositions that can be roughly paraphrased as (3a) and (3b):

- (2) Ken: “Mary believes that I came to Tokyo in 1995”
- (3) a. Ken is in Tokyo at the utterance time. (the “primary” reading)
- b. Mary believes that she is/was in Tokyo at the utterance time or event time. (the “secondary” reading)

On the primary reading, the presupposition is inherited to the matrix sentence; on the secondary reading, it is not (suppose Mary believes that she is in Tokyo although she has never actually been there; (2) on the secondary reading is still acceptable, and thus it does *not* presuppose that Mary is/was in Tokyo).

Based on such observations, I propose that presuppositions are divided into two subtypes: (i) **speech act-oriented presuppositions**, which are triggered by deictic expressions, and (ii) **regular presuppositions**, and that a sentence has three levels of meaning (⟨assertion; regular presupposition; SA-oriented presupposition⟩; cf. Karttunen and Peters 1979). I further propose that attitude predicates have two possible logical forms (linked to one another by a derivation rule), corresponding to the primary and secondary readings. A sentence with a predicate of the first type is true or false only if the SA-oriented presupposition of the complement clause is satisfied, to the effect that it is practically inherited to the matrix clause. With an attitude predicate of the second type, in contrast, the SA-oriented presupposition is turned into a regular presupposition by the relevant translation rule, and thus its inheritance is blocked.